Ex Parte Case Study:
What Happened, What the Law Required,
and What Should Have Happened

This page documents a single, discrete procedural sequence: how real property owned by two parties was authorized for sale, and how the commissioner's signature authority was eventually exercised — entirely without a filed motion, without a served notice, and without a hearing at which the property owner could appear.

Every fact stated on this page is drawn from the official court transcript of the May 11, 2023 hearing, the entered court order from that hearing, email correspondence in the public record, the Whatcom County Odyssey docket, a public records response from the Whatcom County Clerk's office, and the First Amended Complaint filed in Case No. 25-2-01481-37 on November 12, 2025.

This analysis does not assert personal misconduct by any judicial officer. It documents the structural procedural failures — the absence of the required process — and compares what occurred to what Washington law and neighboring county practice require.

Before examining what happened, it is necessary to establish what Washington law required. Four distinct bodies of law govern this situation.

Commissioner Authority — RCW 2.24.040

Washington court commissioners derive their authority entirely from statute. RCW 2.24.040 enumerates the specific powers of commissioners in domestic relations proceedings. That list does not include the power to execute real estate conveyance documents — listing agreements, purchase and sale agreements, or closing documents — as agent or substitute for a party to the transaction.

The commissioner's authority to sign a court order is not the same as the authority to sign as a party to a private real estate transaction. The former is an exercise of judicial power; the latter is a grant of agency authority over a constitutionally protected property interest. Washington law does not authorize commissioners to exercise that agency function under the general grant of RCW 2.24.040(3) without a specific, noticed order establishing the scope, terms, and limits of that authority.

Due Process — Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Washington Constitution both require that before a person is deprived of a protected property interest, they must receive notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. This is not a procedural formality — it is a constitutional floor below which no court order may descend.

An order authorizing the sale of community real property, and granting authority to sign real estate documents on behalf of an owner who has not consented, directly implicates that property interest. The constitutional requirement applies at every stage: when the underlying authority is granted, and when that authority is exercised.

Motion Practice — CR 7(b)(1) and CR 5

Washington Civil Rule 7(b)(1) requires that an application to the court for an order be made by written motion. Civil Rule 5 requires that motions be served on all parties. There is no exception for property matters in dissolution proceedings. A motion to authorize the sale of community real property and to grant commissioner signature authority is subject to both requirements.

When that authority is later exercised — when documents are presented to the commissioner for signature — the exercise of that authority must also be preceded by notice and an opportunity for the opposing party to respond, unless an existing court order has specifically and narrowly authorized ex parte submission under defined conditions.

Findings Requirement — CR 52

Washington Civil Rule 52 requires that in actions tried without a jury, the court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Orders that affect substantial rights — including the authorization to sell community real property and the grant of signature authority over a co-owner's interest — require findings. "Good cause" written in a form order without any articulation of what facts establish good cause, or why the remedy is proportionate, does not satisfy CR 52.

Background: The Property and the Prior Orders

David Snowden and Jolene Snowden (later Olson) purchased 2925 Behme Road, Custer, Washington in 2015. The property became community property upon marriage in 2018. Snowden maintained possession of the property after Olson vacated in April 2022, continuing to pay the mortgage, property taxes, and utilities through the conclusion of the dissolution proceedings and through closing in April 2024.

A November 2022 Temporary Family Law Order (TFO) required that the parties cooperate in listing the property with a real estate agent at a price recommended by the agent, and to cooperate to accept reasonable offers. It stated that if mortgage payments stopped, the property could be listed. That language was permissive, not mandatory — and it did not authorize ex parte signature authority.

Snowden had, separately, developed and was implementing a For-Sale-By-Owner (FSBO) plan documented in emails and draft listings showing both parties had agreed to market the property without a broker. The final dissolution was scheduled for trial in June 2023.

The May 11, 2023 Hearing: How the Authority Was Created

On May 11, 2023, Commissioner Leon F. Henley, Jr. held a hearing in Whatcom County Superior Court. Jolene Snowden appeared pro se. David Snowden did not appear; the record reflects he was served notice of the hearing on April 23, 2023.

The entered order — Order Requiring Respondent to Cooperate with Listing and Selling Real Property; Order Allowing Commissioner to Sign Listing, Offer and Closing Documents Ex Parte — stated that if Respondent did not cooperate, "the Petitioner may submit the documents to the commissioner ex parte, and the court commissioner shall sign the documents on behalf of the Respondent." It further required that net proceeds be deposited in the Whatcom County Superior Court registry upon closing.

Critically, this order contained no findings of fact. It stated only "there is good cause to enter this order" with no articulation of what facts established good cause, what evidence of non-cooperation existed, or why this remedy was proportionate to the claimed conduct. The hearing transcript confirms that the basis for the order was Petitioner's unverified oral representations; no documentary evidence of non-cooperation was examined or entered into the record.

The order also did not define what conduct would constitute "non-cooperation," did not establish any process by which Respondent could contest a determination that he had failed to cooperate, and did not require notice to Respondent before documents would be submitted to the commissioner for signature.

The April 3–4, 2024 Execution: How the Authority Was Exercised

Nearly eleven months after the May 11, 2023 order, the signature authority was exercised. The timeline of events is documented in emails produced in public records requests and in the Odyssey docket — which is notable for what it does not contain.

What the Odyssey Docket Does Not Contain

The Whatcom County Odyssey case management system is the official record of everything filed, served, and docketed in Case No. 22-3-00270-37. For the period of April 3–4, 2024, the Odyssey docket contains no motion, no certificate of service, no declaration of non-cooperation, and no ex parte routing slip documenting the submission of documents to Commissioner Henley.

A public records request to Whatcom County produced a single email — Olson's April 4 message asking to "pick up those signed documents today." The County confirmed this was the only responsive record in Commissioner Henley's files for that date and that no other emails, attachments, or communications were found concerning either the April 3–4 submission or any later claimed signing event. The absence of any additional records corroborates the allegation that no formal process occurred.

The following procedural failures are not characterized from a disputed factual record — each is established by the absence of a document that would exist in the official record if the required process had occurred.

The procedural gaps documented above are not inherent to family law or to the facts of this case. They are the product of local practice choices. Skagit County, Snohomish County, and King County each operate under the same Washington statutes and civil rules — but their ex parte procedures produce a materially different outcome when the same facts are presented.

The comparison below uses the actual facts of the Snowden matter to show how those courts would have processed the same requests. The contrast is not theoretical — it is operational, and it is documented in each county's local rules and published administrative practices.

The absence of proper process had direct, quantifiable consequences for both parties and for third parties who relied on the court's authority in the transaction.

Harm to Third Parties

The procedural failure did not harm only Snowden. The Murray Defendants — the buyers — acquired title under a deed whose lawful authority is now disputed in pending litigation. They hold property subject to a lis pendens and a claim of rescission. Their purchase, made in reliance on the court's apparent authorization, may ultimately require judicial resolution of the underlying fraud claims before their title is secure.

Whatcom Land Title Company (CW Title and Escrow) closed the transaction in reliance on a court order whose validity — and whose terms, including the court registry deposit requirement — it did not independently verify. Under RCW 18.44.400(1)(b), an escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty of care to all parties; closing without verifying the authority and scope of the court order potentially breached that duty.

The real estate agent, Julie Carter, submitted documents for commissioner signature as a substitute for Snowden's consent — despite Snowden's explicit written response that he was not refusing to cooperate but was setting conditions. Her April 3 email explicitly threatened: "If you do not wish to sign the contract we will just have the commissioner sign off on it." This use of the court's authority as leverage in a private commercial negotiation is itself a misuse of process.

The facts documented in this analysis are not unique to Snowden v. Snowden. They are the product of institutional practices that apply to every proceeding in which an ex parte submission is made to Whatcom County Superior Court. Any litigant — in any family law, civil, probate, or injunction matter — who finds themselves on the wrong side of an ex parte submission faces the same structural disadvantage: no intake log, no routing slip, no chain-of-custody record, and no mechanism by which they can reconstruct what a judicial officer received and when.

The comparison to Skagit, Snohomish, and King County is not academic. Those counties process the same types of cases under the same Washington statutes. Their administrative controls exist precisely to prevent the sequence documented here. The fact that Whatcom County has not adopted similar controls is a policy choice — and a choice with concrete consequences for litigants who are excluded from knowing what is being presented to a judicial officer in their name.

The procedural framework exists to protect everyone. It protects the party who initiates a motion by ensuring their submission is properly recorded and can be defended on appeal. It protects the opposing party by ensuring they have notice and an opportunity to respond. And it protects the integrity of the judicial record by ensuring that what occurred can be verified, reviewed, and if necessary, corrected.

When that framework is absent, the party who controls the process — who submits documents directly, who controls the timeline, and who benefits from the commissioner's signature — has an asymmetric advantage that the rules are specifically designed to prevent.